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PREFACE 
The Kingdom of Laos, a small, weak, and peaceful country which occupies a key position 
in Southeast Asia, is under attack by Communist-led forces which oppose the duly elected 
government and seek to impose their will over the Kingdom and its small army. 
The fighting which began in Laos in July 1959 is of particular concern to the United States 
and to the rest of the free world because it is part of the pattern of Communist bloc aggres-
siveness that is basic to much of the tension existing in the world today. Laos, removed from 
the mainstream of the world events through most of its recent history, finds itself a frontline 
of the free world. 
The Communist forces that now threaten the independence of Laos owe their strength to 
the direction and support they have received from Communist countries, especially Commu-
nist China and even more particularly Communist north Viet-Nam. The history of the past ten 
years is witness to the determination of the Communists and particularly of north Viet-Nam--
a giant alongside Laos in population and strength--to prevent the people of Laos from pro-
gressing freely and peacefully toward the social and economic development of their country. 
Although not a major theater of war during the Indochina hostilities of 1946-54, Laos had 
been invaded by Vietnamese Communist forces allied with Communist-indoctrinated dissident 
Lao calling themselves the Pathet Lao (Land of the Lao). Even after it had achieved inde-
pendence by peaceful negotiations with France, Laos found itself facing formidable problems. 
The Pathet Lao, guided and supported by north Viet-Nam, refused to give up territory in 
northern Laos it had occupied during the war, and proceeded to build up its military forces 
and subversive network. Not until more than three years after the 1954 Geneva peace settle-
ment did the Pathet Lao, having achieved important concessions from the Royal Government, 
agree to the reunification of the Kingdom and ostensibly to the dissolution of its military 
establishment. Failing to achieve their objectives of gaining control of the country through 
the normal processes of constitutional government, the Communists recently have reverted 
to the use of force. 
The following account reviews the present situation in Laos and its background. It 
describes the efforts of the Royal Government of Laos to carry out its international commit-
ments in good faith and to preserve its independence and identity. It also testifies to the 
opposition, largely Communist-inspired, that Laos has had to face along this road. 
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THE KINGDOM, THE LAND, AND THE PEOPLE 
History 
The Kingdom of Laos, strategically located, but the smallest in terms of population and 
least developed of any state in Southeast Asia, was formed after World War II from an area 
that had been ruled by France since 1893. Before the period of French rule, Laos consisted 
of a loosely knit aggregation of petty principalities, at times united under one king but more 
often existing as more or less separate entities. Under the French the northern part of Laos 
was organized into the Kingdom of Luang Prabang and the southern part into the principality 
of Bassac,and both became components of French Indochina, which also included Viet-Nam and 
Cambodia. 
In the closing weeks of World War II, anticipating their imminent defeat, Indochina's 
Japanese occupiers persuaded nationalist leaders to declare Luang Prabang independent. In 
September 1945 the proclamation of independence was extended to include Bassac, and Sisa-
vang Vong, who had been the King of Luang Prabang since 1903, was proclaimed King of Laos. 
Shortly thereafter, however, the leaders of a nationalist movement known as "Free Lao" 
formed a short-lived "provisional government," dethroning the king allegedly because he was 
pro-French, and organized small armed units to resist returning French-led forces. By May 
1946 these "Free Lao" units had been overpowered and the "provisional government" leaders 
had fled to Thailand where they set up a "government-in-exile." Although France reestab-
lished its rule, it accepted the nationalist principle of a territorially united Laos under 
Sisavang Vong as King and in a provisional agreement of August 1946 gave the new kingdom 
a considerable degree of administrative authority. 
During the next several years, Laos progressed toward full independence. A parliamen-
tary system with a popularly elected National Assembly dates from the promulgation of a 
constitution in May 1947. Under an agreement with France signed in July 1949, Laos became 
an independent state within the French Union. Thereupon the "government-in-exile" in Bang-
kok was dissolved and most of the leaders of the "Free Lao" movement returned to take part 
in the Royal Government of Laos. Under a Treaty of Friendship and Association signed in 
October 1953, France recognized the Kingdom of Laos as "a fully independent and sovereign 
state," and transferred to Laos all of the remaining French administrative powers except 
certain supervisory rights relating to military affairs and economic matters, which were 
finally given up in late 1954. The United Kingdom,France, and the United States extended 
diplomatic recognition to Laos in February 1950. Subsequently the overwhelming nnajority of 
free-world states have recognized Laos. Laos became a member of the United Nations in 
December 1955. 
Geography and People 
A landlocked country with a total area of about 90,000 square miles (smaller than the 
state of Colorado), Laos is situated in a relatively inaccessible portion of the Indochinese 
peninsula. It shares a 600-mile border with north Viet-Nam and Conamunist China in addition 
to common frontiers with the Republic of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. 
Perhaps less than half of the total population, roughly estimated to be 2 million, are 
ethnic Lao, a people of Thai stock. There are also more than a dozen distinct Thai minority 
groups, sometimes called "tribal" Thai, as well as sizable numbers of other indigenous 
minority groups, including the Meo, the Phoutheng, the Yao, and several Tibeto-Burman 
peoples. Groups related to all of these peoples also inhabit the areas surrounding Laos. The 
Lao are the dominant group, the Lao language is the national language, and Buddhism, the 
religion of the Lao, is the national religion. Nevertheless, diversity is so great that Laos, 
rather than being a single society with a universally shared pattern of culture, is an aggre-
gate of societies differing significantly in ethnic origin, language, and culture. Only about 15 
percent of the people are literate. 
The rugged, mountainous terrain or jungle growth of much of the country tends also to 
keep the population fragmented in small, self-contained communities bound together only 
tenuously by very poor communications and transportation systems. There are few roads, no 
railways, and only a handful of small airfields usable throughout the year. The Mekong River, 
which forms more than 500 miles of the western boundary of Laos, is a major avenue of 
transportation, but its narrows and rapids, together with seasonal fluctuations in water levels, 
limit itsuse to small craft. The majority ot the population still depends on traditional methods 
of transportation: foot, oxcart, elephant, horse, and dugout canoe. Modern communications fa-
cilities are sparse. 
Economy 
Removed from the center, of Asian affairs as well as from the mainstream of modern 
civilization throughout most of its history, Laos has only recently come to know modern tech-
nology. Subsistence agriculture is the basis of the economy, rice being the dominant crop. 
About 95 percent of the people derive their existence from the land. Internal trade is con-
ducted mainly by barter. Export earnings total only $2 million to $3 million annually, far too 
little for a country almost completely dependent on imports for manufactured goods. Per 
capita income is roughly estimated at about $50 per year. 
OraGINS OF THE LAO CX)MMUNIST MOVEMENT 
Communist spokesmen claim that the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao originated in the 
"Free Lao" (Lao Issara) nationalist movement in 1945, and that Pathet Lao "resistance 
comnnittees" were formed in 1946 to fight against the French. Actually, however, the Pathet ^ ^ 
Lao movement appears to have originated several years later under circumstances indicating 
that it was created, sponsored, and controlled by the Communist "Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam" (DRV). 
The DRV had been formed at Hanoi in September 1945 as a "government" that ostensibly 
represented a broad nationalist coalition seeking independence for Vietnam. In time, it be-
came clear that the DRV was controlled by Communists who were utilizing the governmental 
facade and the nationalist struggle to advance their own drive for power throughout Indochina. 
The hostilities that broke out between DRV forces and French-led forces in northern Viet-Nam 
in late 1946 soon spread to other areas of Viet-Nam. In 1950 the Chinese Communists, who by 
then, having seized control of Mainland China, had a common border with the DRV, began to 
supply it with large-scale aid in the fight against France. The Vietnamese Communists began 
to emerge openly as the rulers of the DRV and the main force behind a revolutionary move-
ment that aimed to establish their control throughout Indochina. 
When, in 1949, most of the leaders of the "Free Lao" returned to participate in the gov-
ernment of Laos, a few dissidents, the most prominent being Prince Souphanouvong, turned 
to the Vietnamese Communists. Even before the dissolution of the "government-in-exile" 
Prince Souphanouvong had formed a "Lao Liberation Committee" in Bangkok. This committee, 
the precursor of the Pathet Lao ^  denounced both the Royal Government of Laos and the "Free ^^  
Lao" leaders, claimed to represent all the people of "Free Laos , " and announced that it would ^^^ 
"closely cooperate with Resistance Movements in the two other Indochinese countries, Viet-
Nam and Cambodia, in order to fight the common foe, French colonialism." Little more was 
heard of this committee, but inSeptember 1950, after Souphanouvong had left Bangkok for the 
DRV, Vietnamese Communist radio broadcasts announced the formation of a "resistance gov-
ernment of Pathet Lao" and hailed it as the true expression of the Lao Issara. In November 
1950 the DRV radio claimed that a "national assembly of Pathet Lao, " allegedly composed of 
more than 100 "elected representatives of all the ethnic minorities and Social classes of 
Laos , " had met in August 1950 presumably in DRV-controlled territory. Subsequent broad-
casts reported that the "assembly" had established a "Laotian National United Front," formed 
a "resistance government," elected Souphanouvong as "prime minister," and founded a " P e o -
ple's Liberation Army. " 
Later events provided further evidence of the close ties between the Pathet Lao " r e s i s t -
ance government" and the Vietnamese Communist regime. In March 1951, the "Laotian Na-
tional United Front" became affiliated with a similar organization for dissident Cambodians 
created by the Vietnamese Conmiunists, and a tri-national "Vietnamese-Cambodia-Laos A l -
liance Bloc" .was then created. The dependent roles of the Lao and Cambodian groups, how-
ever, was revealed in a Vietnamese Communist document issued in November 1951 which 
noted that "the Vietnamese Party reserves the right to supervise the activities of its brother 
Parties in Cambodia and Laos. " The document stated further that 
...the Central Executive Concmiittee of the Vietnamese Workers Party has designated 
a Cambodian and a Laotian bureau charged with assisting the revolutionary move- ^ . 
ments in these countries. It organizes periodic assemblies of the three parties in ^ ^ 
order to discuss questions of common interest; it works toward the creation of a 
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Vietnamese-Khmer-Laotian United Front. Militarily Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 
constitute a combat zone; Viet-Nam has substantially assisted Cambodia and Laos 
militarily as well as from all other points of view., . . 
Although the DRV radio between 1950 and early 1953 periodically made resounding clairns 
concerning the strength and achievements of the "Laotian National United Front" and the 
Pathet Lao "resistance government," there was little concrete evidence that the Pathet Lao 
did anything more than maintain a few small guerrilla bands along the Laos-Viet -Nam border. 
Nevertheless, in June 1951 the Chinese Communist radio attributed to Prince Souphanouvong 
claims that his regime exercised formal authority over one-sixth of Laos, that Pathet Lao 
guerrillas controlled one-third of Laos, and that "democratic elections" in two-thirds of Laos 
had selected representatives to the regional executive committees of the "National United 
Front." Informal Communist bloc "recognition" of the Pathet Lao "resistance government" 
was also indicated inDRV broadcasts in 1952, which noted for example that an "off icial " letter 
had been sent to the Soviet Government by the Pathet Lao "foreign minister." 
THE DRV INVADES LAOS, 1953-54 
Apart from sporadic guerrilla activity, Laos remained relatively free of active fighting 
until April 1953 when DRV armed forces launched the first of three full-scale invasions. 
French Union forces moved to check this thrust, and by mid-1953 had limited the Communists 
to a portion of northern Laos and to guerrilla pockets in the south. A second invasion was 
launched in central Laos in December 1953, with the apparent aim of splitting the kingdom in 
two. A third invasion, directed at northern Laos from northwest Viet-Nam, followed in Febru-
ary 1954; this attack appeared to be aimed at the city of Luang Prabang, where the King main-
tained his residence. By the end of February 1954, these incursions had also been checked. 
Although regular units of the Vietnamese Communist army constituted the bulk of the in-
vading forces, DRV broadcasts at the time contended that these troops were "volunteers" as -
sisting the Pathet Lao "liberation" forces. DRV and other Communist propagandists then and 
since have sought to minimize the DRV role, and to portray military operations in Laos in 
1953-54 as local in nature and as part of a lengthy internal struggle. 
The Vietnamese Communist newspaper Nhan Dan gave the Conrununist version of the war-
time (1953-54) role of the Pathet Lao in an article published on August 13, 1955, commemo-
rating the fifth anniversary of the alleged convening of the Pathet Lao "National Assembly . " 
This article made no mention of the predominant participation of DRV troops or of the fact 
that the invasion of Laos was launched from DRV territory. Instead entire "credit " was given 
to "offensives" opened by the "Laotian People's Liberation Army. " 
It was during the first DRV invasion that Prince Souphanouvong and his followers moved 
into Laos. The Pathet Lao leader announced on April 21, 1953 that his "resistance govern-
ment" had been set up in the town of Sam Neua, the capital of the province of Sam Neua which 
borders on north Viet-Nam, and declared it to be "the only legal representative government 
of Laos. " DRV-Pathet Lao invasion forces during 1953-54 occupied at one time or another 
up to one-fourth of the area of the kingdom on a temporary basis, but they apparently did not 
establish an administrative system outside the two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong 
Saly which they occupied from 1953 to 1957. 
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954 
Hostilities in Indochina between local forces led by the Vietnamese Communists (Viet 
Minh) and French Union forces, which had been continuing since 1946, were brought to an 
end by agreements reached at a conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, in April-July 1954. 
Representatives of the United Kingdom and the USSR acted as co-chairmen of the conference, 
in which Cambodia, France, Laos, the State of Viet-Nam (non-Conrmiunist Viet-Nam), and the 
United States, as well as representatives of Communist China and the DRV, also participated. 
Both before the conference, in radio propaganda, and during its sessions, the DRV made 
efforts to have Pathet Lao representatives participate. At the first plenary session, on May 8, 
1954, DRV Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong offered a resolution, supported by the delegates 
of Communist China and the USSR, *'to invite the representatives of the governments of re -
sistance of Khmer and Pathet Lao to take part in the work of the conference in regard to the 
question of the reestablishment of peace in Indochina." In a speech at the second plenary 
session of the conference (May 10, 1954), Pham Van Dong made the spurious claim that the 
Pathet Lao had "liberated" one-half of Laos from the French Union forces, and presented 
peace proposals in the name of both the DRV and the Pathet Lao. During many subsequent 
sessions, the DRV continued unsuccessfully to press for Pathet Lao participation. At least one 
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Pathet Lao leader, Nouhak Phoumsavan, attended the conference as a member of the DRV 
delegation. Pathet Lao agents in Geneva distributed pamphlets entitled "The People of Pathet 
Lao struggle for Peace, Independence, Unity, and Democracy,'* which carried the notation on 
the flyleaf thatthey had been "re-edited by the Information Agency of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam." 
Understandings reached at Geneva concerning Laos were contained in (1) an Agreement 
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, which was signed "For the Commander-in-Chief of 
the fighting units of 'Pathet Lao'" as well as on behalf of the DRV army by Ta Quang Buu, 
DRV Vice Minister of National Defense, and by a French military representative on behalf 
of the French Union forces which represented the interests of Laos; (2) two unilateral Decla-
rations by the Royal Government of Laos;jand (3) the Final Declaration of the Geneva Con-
ference. 
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in 
LSOS, July 
-The following excerpts from the Agreement are pertinent to the present situation in 
Laos: 
Article 6. With effect from the proclamation of the ceasefire the introduction 
into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Lao-
tian territory is prohibited. 
Nevertheless» the French High Command may leave a specified number of 
French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army 
in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thous-
and five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers. 
Article 7. Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establish-
ment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos. 
Article 8. The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the terri-
tory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of two French military 
establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the 
province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane. 
The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a 
total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men. 
Article 9. Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accord- SA\ 
ance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government 
of Laos on 20, July 1954, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and 
military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified 
quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos. 
Article 10. The new armaments and military personnel permitted to enter Laos 
in accordance with the terms of Article 9 above shall enter Laos at the following 
points only: Luang-Prabang, Xieng-Khouang, Vientiane, Seno, Pakse, Savannakhet 
and Tchepone. 
Article 14. Pending a political settlement, the fighting units of "Pathet Lao," 
concentrated in the provisional assembly areas, shall move into the Provinces of 
Phongsaly and Sam-Neua, except for any military personnel who wish to be de-
mobilized where they are. . . . 
Article 15. Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimi-
nation against persons or organisations for their activities during the hostilities 
and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic freedoms. 
Article 25. An International Commission shall be responsible for control and 
supervision of the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation 
of hostilities in Laos. It shall be composed of representatives of the following 
States: Canada, India, and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative -
of India. Its headquarters shall be at Vientiane. 
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j Article 39. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos 
I may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet-
^ Nam and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Viet-
j ' Nam, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unani-
mously. 
Declarations by the Royal Government of 
Laos, July 21, 1954 J 
1 The first Declaration was as follows: 
.4 The Royal Government of Laos, 
In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the King-
dom, , 
Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, 
without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom 
provides: 
Affirms that all Laotian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates 
^ ^ in general elections by secret ballot; 
Announces, furthermore, that it will promulgate measures to provide for special 
representation in the Royal Administration of the provinces of Phong Saly and 
Sam Neua during the interval between the cessation of hostilities and the general 
elections of the interests of Laotian nationals who did not support the Royal 
forces during hostilities. 
The second Declaration read: 
The Royal Government of Laos is resolved never to pursue a policy of aggres-
sion and will never permit the territory of Laos to be used in furtherance of such 
a policy. 
The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agreement with other States 
if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to 
participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations or with the principle of the agreement on the ces-
sation of hostilities or, unless its security is threatened, the obligation to es-
^ ^ tablish bases on Laotian territory for military forces of foreign Powers. 
"W 
The Royal Government of Laos is resolved to settle its international disputes by 
peaceful means so that international peace and security and justice are not en-
dangered. 
During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam and the final 
settlement of that country's political problems, the Royal Government of Laos 
will not request foreign aid, whether in war materiel, in personnel or in instruc-
tors, except for the purpose of its effective territorial defence and to the extent 
defined by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. 
> ^^nal Declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954 
Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Final Declaration took note of the various commitments made 
by the Royal Government of Laos in the two Declarations quoted above. Article 12 of the 
Final Declaration said: 
In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the 
Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, 
the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to re-
refrain from any interference in their internal affairs. 
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The United States and the Geneva Agreements 
In stating that it was not prepared to join in the Final Declaration, the United States de-
clared unilaterally that it would 
refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them [the various agree-
ments reached at Geneva and the Final Declaration, in accordance with Article 
2 (Section 4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of 
Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force; and... would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the afore-
said Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international 
peace and security. 
THE COMMUNISTS REFUSE TO GIVE UP 
PHONG SALY AND SAM NEUA PROVINCES 
Almost immediately after the close of the Geneva Conference, the Pathet Lao made it 
clear that it intended to abide only by such provisions of the agreements as it considered 
favorable. On August 8, 1954, two days after the ceasefire became effective in Laos, the 
Pathet Lao indicated that it would refuse to permit the Lao Government to reestablish its 
administration in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, which border on the 
DRV. 
The Pathet Lao chief. Prince Souphanouvong, stated baldly on November 20, 1954, that 
The Pathet Lao forces . . . have proclaimed the power of the Pathet Lao in 
the two provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly.. . . 
Although in the same statement Prince Souphanouvong admitted that the two provinces had 
been "placed in principle under the supreme authority of the Royal Government," on March 5, 
1955, Radio Hanoi broadcast a statement of a "Pathet Lao Command spokesman" to the effect 
that 
. . .all encroachments upon the territory of the two provinces of Sam Ne\ia 
and Phong Saly are at utter variance with the Geneva Armistice Agreement 
in its letter and spirit. The Pathet Lao forces are determined to oppose 
these acts of violence and will not bear responsibility in case the Pathet 
Lao units are compelled to defend themselves. 
The DRV "Advises " the Pathet Lao in 
Administering Phong Saly and Sam Neua 
m 
Although the Communists no longer referred to the "Pathet Lao Resistance Government" 
after the Geneva ceasefire, the leading members of that group remained in authority in Pathet 
Lao-controlled Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Prince Souphanouvong became "Pr ime Minister of 
the Pathet Lao administration," as well as the initial head of the "ministries" of National 
Defense, Economic and Financial Affairs, Interior, Foreign Affair s, and Education and Propa-
ganda, and the chairman of various front organizations. All other offices, from provincial 
governor down to village chief, were filled by Pathet Lao sympathizers. 
Despite the facade of Pathet Lao government, however, it was the North Vietnamese Com-
munists who really controlled the Pathet Lao administration. Some efforts were made to 
camouflage the DRV's control and its continuous and direct liaison with the Pathet Lao; for 
example, foreigners were prohibited from entering the Thai-Meo "autonomous zone" in 
north Viet-Nam which is adjacent to Phong Salyand Sam Neua provinces. However, the facts 
are clear. A central coordinating mission of ranking Vietnamese Communists responsible 
for "guiding" the Pathet Lao leadership was located not far from Pathet Lao headquarters in 
the town of Sam Neua. This mission was in turn "guided" by a special DRV staff for Laos 
situated across the border in north Viet-Nam. DRV "advisors" were attached to Pathet Lao 
"ministries . " Officers at the lower levels of the Pathet Lao administration structure were 
similarly "assisted" by Vietnamese Communist "advisors. " On some occasions DRV troops 
even entered Sam Neua province and engaged in joint maneuvers with Pathet Lao military 
units, which in addition had permanent DRV "advisors" on their staff. In north Viet-Nam, the 'J^ 
DRV operated (and still operates) training facilities for Pathet Lao military personnel and 
undercover agents. 
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The ICC Contests Pathet Lao Control of the Provinces 
The International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC) in Laos, established 
under the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, made several attempts shortly after 
the Geneva Conference to persuade the Pathet Lao to recognize the jurisdiction of the Royal 
Government over Phong Saly and Sam Neua. These efforts having proved unsuccessful, the 
ICC then expressed its views in a resolution adopted on January 7, 1956. 
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, 
I. Considering that the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity 
of Laos were recognized in the Geneva settlement; 
II, Recalling its unanimous resolution of December 3, 1954, by which it reco-
ommended that representatives of the Royal Government and of the Fighting 
Units of the Pathet Lao should examine together the means which should be 
adopted to attain the political settlement envisaged in Article 14 of the Geneva 
Agreement, including the reestablishment of the Royal Administration in the 
provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly; 
III. Considering that on June 15, 1955, the Commission unanimously addressed a 
letter to the Royal Government recognising its right to the actual administra-
tion of these two provinces,... 
VII. Considering that, without the Royal Government's administration in the two 
northern provinces, it would be impossible to obtain full integration of the 
Fighting Units of the Pathet Lao into the national community as envisaged in 
the Geneva settlement; 
(1) Expresses regret that the efforts hitherto made to bring about a settle-
ment have so far produced no result; 
(2) Reiterates that the intention of the Geneva Agreement is to preserve the 
the unity of Laos; 
(3) Reiterates the sovereign right of the Royal Government to establish its 
administration in the two northern provinces, and that this right is un-
disputed; 
(4) Expresses concern at the difficult situation which has arisen as a result 
of the failure of the negotiations; 
(5) Recommends to the Parties: 
(i) To observe strictly the recommendations contained in the Commission's 
Resolution of December 9, 1955, for effective cessation of hostilities; 
(ii) That without further delay the Royal Administration should be re-estab-
lished in the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly and the Royal Gov-
ernment should concurrently take necessary measures to bring about 
the integration of Pathet Lao fully and ''without discrimination into the 
national community ;'*,.,. 
The Royal Government promptly accepted the January 17 resolution, but the Pathet Lao 
failed to do so, as noted in a letter of February 15, 1956, from the ICC to the co-chairmen 
of the Geneva Conference, and retained its claim to the two provinces until late in 1957. 
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THE COMMUNISTS BUILD UP 
THEIR MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE FORCES 
Violation of the Cease-Fire; Buildup of Forces 
In entrenching itself illegally in Phong Saly and Sann Neua, the Pathet Lao did not hesitate 
to carry out its threat to maintain its position by force. ICC investigation of the Royal Govern-
nnent's nunnerous, documented charges of Pathet Lao ceasefire violations was frequently 
blocked because of the Polish member *s unvarying hostility to the Royal Government and be-
cause of the uncooperativeness of the Pathet Lao. 
The ICC in its Third Interim Report (Chapter VIII), under the heading "Cooperation of 
the Fighting Units of Pathet Lao with the Commission" described the obstructive tacts of the 
Pathet Lao as follows: 
In one instance, when the Commission's team went to a village for investigation, they 
were tied up and examination of witnesses was rendered impossible. When this inci-
dent was brought to the notice of the Pathet Lao High Command, they offered apolo-
gies, but stated that since the team went without advance information, the team m e m -
bers should have tried to solve the local difficulties by a "policy of persuasion rather 
than by outbursts of anger." Similar incidents involving the French crew of the Com-
mission's helicopters also occurred; in some cases the crew were denied freedom of 
movement from a few hours to two days and were treated with great discourtesy. 
When these incidents were brought to the attention of the Pathet Lao, they re-
plied that since there was nothing to show that the crew were working on behalf of 
the Commission the Pathet Lao were not sure if they had not come with hostile in-
tentions.,.. 
A major difficulty that the Commission experienced from the Pathet Lao side was 
related to the non-availability of witnesses for investigation. It was esctremely diffi-
cult for the Commission's teams to search for witnesses because the Pathet Lao 
local authorities often took the view that the areas in which the witnesses might be 
residing were unsafe and that the Commission members should not proceed at their 
own risk since the Pathet Lao did not wish any untoward incident to happen to the 
Commission members which might bring discredit to the Pathet Lao. Besides, since 
the Pathet Lao were responsible for the security of the teams, they stated that they 
would have to make necessary arrangements before the team could move around. On 
two or three occasions when the team members proceeded to pursue witnesses on 
their own, their freedom of movement was either denied or very strictly limited. 
The Commission brought all these instances to the notice of the Pathet Lao High 
Command. The Pathet Lao in some cases gave suitable apologies and in others ad-
hered to their point of view that unless advance information for investigation was 
given they could not completely ensure that these difficulties would never occur 
again. 
Moreover, the Pathet Lao steadily built up its military forces. Although in 1954 the num-
ber of Pathet Lao troops was estimated to be less than 1,000, in February 1958, after the 
Pathet Lao had agreed to demobilization or integration of its forces with the Royal Lao Army, 
more than 6,000 Pathet Lao military personnel were processed. This six-fold increase in the 
number of troops could have taken place without foreign assistance and might therefore not 
have been in violation of the Geneva Agreements. The corresponding increases in Pathet Lao 
military equipment, however, could have resulted only from supply movements originating in 
or passing through north Viet-Nam in clear violation of the Agreement on the Cessation of 
Hostilities in Laos (Articles 9 and 10), 
The Communists Develop Their Subversive Apparatus 
The Viet Minh started sending resident agents to villages as early as 1948 and a nucleus 
of well-indoctrinated propagandists remained behind in other parts of Laos when the Pathet 
Lao regrouped in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces in August 1954. They were chosen on 
the basis of the trust in which they were held by the local population, their acquaintance with 
the local area, and, in particular, their acquaintance with the families of those Pathet Lao 
personnel who regrouped in the north. The Pathet Lao propagandists constituted a subversive 
network whose mission included the preparation of arms caches and the reception of agents 
sent from Sam Neua. Groups of agents were sent throughout Laos as early as May 1955, com-
monly to regions of which they were natives. 
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By mid-1956 the Pathet Lao and DRV were concentrating on operations designed to en-
trench their clandestine subversive network in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces and to ex-
tend their operations in the ten other provinces of Laos. By that date, more thaui 3,000 par-
tisans from Sam Neua and Phong Saly had been recruited from the local population into the 
clandestine net in the area. As a result the Pathet Lao "administration" was able to release 
hard-core Communists from military missions in Sam Neua and Phong Saly for service on 
clandestine missions in the other provinces. Several hundred such persons apparently were 
despatched into the Royal Government-controlled areas during 1956 alone. 
These cadres engaged in organizational work establishing administrative committees, 
making contact with Pathet Lao sympathizers, establishing arms depots, and recruiting for 
guerrilla and intelligence activities in the Royal Government zone. The majority of these 
cadres were sent into frontier areas in Lao provinces bordering Viet-Nam in order to estab-
lish a broad, entrenched subversive apparatus which could be used either for political mani-
pulation in the event of a political settlement or as an enlarged guerrilla force if negotiations 
between the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao broke down. 
Outside Sam Neua and Phong Saly the Pathet Lao subversive network was most active in 
the areas that had been penetrated by the Vietnamese Communist and Pathet Lao forces during 
the invasions of 1953-54. These infested areas included Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Xieng 
Khouang, Savannakhet and Thakhek (Khammouane)provinces, and the region of the Bolovens 
Plateau in southern Laos encompassing parts of Saravane, Champassak and Attopeu provinces. 
Concentrating on isolated rural areas, the Pathet Lao sought to convert the unsophisti-
cated villagers. To this end the organizers agitated against the Royal Government and en-
couraged villagers to disobey governmental authorities, resorting to terroristic methods, 
when necessary, to maintain their influence over the people. 
The Pathet Lao clandestine network also sought to subvert the various ethnic minorities 
inhabiting the mountainous areas (as differentiated from the ethnic Lao who normally inhabit 
the river valleys), particularly the moxintainous area adjacent to the north Vietnamese border. 
Establishing themselves in Thai-minority, Meo, or Phoutheng villages, Pathet Lao organizers 
worked on the prejudices of their inhabitants to incite them against the Lao Government. 
Among the Meo, for example, the Pathet Lao catered to separatist feelings by encouraging the 
Meo to believe that, when the Pathet Lao assumed control of the government of Laos, the Meo 
would be allowed to establish their own state. Through this and similar tactics the Pathet Lao 
subversive network was able to thread its supply and infiltration routes throughout Laos. 
THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOS 
CARRIES OUT ITS COMMITMENTS 
The Final Declaration (Article 3) of the Geneva Conference and the first Declaration of 
the Royal Government of Laos imposed two obligations on the Royal Government with respect 
to a political settlement: to integrate all citizens into the national community, and to provide 
"special representation |of the Pathet La^in the Royal Administration" of Sam Neua and Phong 
Saly provinces. The final Declaration also noted that the next general elections in Laos were 
scheduled to take place in 1955. In its efforts to arrive at a settlement with the Pathet Lao, 
the Lao Government not only lived up to its Geneva commitments but also offered concessions 
that went well beyond those commitments. 
General Elections of December 25, 1955 
The Royal Government, in accordance with its constitutional processes, scheduled general 
elections for the whole of Laos for August 28, 1955. Although the government guaranteed free 
elections by secret ballot, in which the Pathet Lao could participate without discrimination, 
the Pathet Lao nevertheless balked. Accordingly, on June 9, 1955 the government postponed 
the elections until December 25, 1955, in the hope that the Pathet Lao would agree to partici-
pate. The Pathet Lao, instead, demanded drastic changes in the electoral law, a position criti-
cised by the ICC (Third Interim Report, Chapter II of the Appendix to Annexure I), in the fol-
lowing terms: 
It appears to us that the Geneva Agreement does not contemplate change in the Con-
stitution and that the changes in the Electoral Law need be considered only when its 
provisions are discriminatory to any opposition parties such as Pathet Lao. It also 
appears to us that with some of the modifications the Royal Government are pre-
pared to accept, no major modification will appeal^ necessary. 
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The ICC further observed (Third Interim Report, Chapter IV of Appendix to Annexure I) 
The Royal Government has given assurance that noPathet Lao candidate who prima 
facie qualifies under Article 6 the Electoral L a ^ , will be rejected. 
It was the understanding of the ICC that 
...the Government will accept a certificate of literacy issued by Pathet Lao authori-
ties for Pathet Lao candidates... 
as the required certification under Article 6. Despite these assurances, the Pathet Lao re-
fused to participate, and in fact attempted, although \insuccessfully, to persuade voters to 
abstain. 
General elections were held as scheduled on December 25, 1955 for all 39 seats of the 
National Assembly. More than 80 percent of the eligible voters participated. The two major 
moderate parties, the National Progressive Party of Prime Minister Katay D. Sasorith and 
the Independent Party led by Phoui Sananikone, won three-fourths of the seats. A new gov»-
ernment led by Prince Souvanna Phouma, a member of the National Progressive Party, was 
invested by the National Assembly on March 21, 1956 by a vote of 33 to one. 
^ Coalition Government and Supplementary Elections 
None of the Geneva Conference agreements required the formation of a coalition govern-
ment as a prerequisite to the political settlement in Laos. However, in its efforts to achieve 
a united nation and despite the Pathet Lao's refusal to participate in the 1955 elections, the 
Royal Lao Government agreed on August 10, 1956 to the "setting up of a National Union 
Government with the participation of the Representatives of the Pathet Lao Forces" to be 
followed by supplementary elections for additional National Assembly seats. Five days before, 
the Lao Government had recognized the right of the Pathet Lao "front," the Neo Lao Hak 
Xat, to "undertake their activities in the legal forms as the other political parties." 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong subsequently issued '^ 
joint Royal Government-Pathet Lao communique on December 28, 1956, which included the 
following paragraph: 
In order to enable the cooperation between the two Parties to achieve National unity 
and facilitate the settlement of the pending questions, the two Princes are agreed on 
the expansion of the present Government before the holding of the general supple-
mentary elections. The coalition government, to {sii^ which the Pathet Lap Forces 
will be adequately represented, will thus constitute a symbol of the national recon-
ciliation on the bases of a proper policy aiming at building up a pacific, democratic, 
united, independent and prosperous Laos. The coalition government will have to 
receive the confidence of the National Assembly in accordance with the Constitution. 
According to the Third Interim Report (Annexure 14) of the ICC, a letter signed jointly by 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong was sent to thje chairman of the 
ICC on December 29, 1956. The co-authors ofthe letter informed the chairman of their joint 
communique of December 28, 1956 and requested him to 
inform the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and assure them that once the 
general supplementary elections will .have been held in the conditions and circum-
stances mentioned in the joint communique, the political settlement as foreseen by 
Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement will be realised.... 
Following the signature of political and military agreements between the Royal Govern-
ment and the Pathet Lao in November 1957, a coalition cabinet, including Pathet Lao members 
Prince Souphanouvong, as Minister of Plans, Reconstruction and Urbanism, and Phoumi 
Vongvichit, as Minister of Religion and Fine Arts, was unanimously invested by the National 
Assembly of Laos on November 19, 1957. 
On February 21, 1957, the two sides had agreed on a proposed new electoral law, ap-
proved by the National Assembly of Laos on October 28, 1957, which provided for supplemen-
tary elections to increase the number of deputies from 39 to 59. The Royal Government, de-
spite its wish that the elections be held earlier, yielded to the demands of the Neo Lao Hak 
Xat for delay and announced on December 10, 1957 that supplementary elections would be 
held in May 1958. 
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Elections were held in all provinces of the kingdom on May 4, 1958, for the 20 new seats 
plus one additional seat to fill a vacancy. The pro-government candidates--principally mem-
bers of the Independent and the National Progressive parties--won a solid majority of the 
popular vote, against approximately 40 percent won by an electoral front composed of the 
Communist-controlled Neo Lao Hcik Xat and the fellow-traveling Santiphab party. The Neo 
Lao Hak Zat nevertheless won nine of the seats contested, and the Santiphab four, owing in 
part to the fact that the pro-government vote in mosjt of the constituencies was split among 
several candidates. 
Following the supplementary elections, the expanded National Assembly was composed 
of 38 non-Communist deputies, and 21 members and supporters of,the Neo Lao Hak Xat-
Santiphab front. 
The Pathet Lao Receives Special Representation and Relinquishes 
Control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua 
On April 19, 1955,'the Lao Governpient had offered the Pathet Lao half the civil offices 
at all levels in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, an offer far exceeding the Royal 
Government's Geneva commitment to "special representation" for the Pathet Lao. It was not 
until two and one-half years later, however, on November 12, 1957, that the Pathet Lao ac-
cepted the Royal Government's offer. The agreement signed on that date by Prince 
Souphanouvong on behalf of the Pathet Lao provided in part that 
From the date of publication of the Declaration of handing over of the two Provinces 
to the Royal Government, the two Provinces shall effectively be placed under the de-
pendence of the Kingdom. All the laws in force in the Kingdom shall be applied there. 
They shall be governed by the Constitution and the laws of the Kingdom. 
Pursuant to this agreement, the authority of the Royal Government over Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua was finally recognizedby the Pathet Lao after almost three and one-half years of illegal 
control. The province of Sam Neua was officially transferred to the Lao Government by Prince 
Souphanouvong on December 8, 1957, and the province of Phong Saly on December 12, 1957. 
In accordance with the commitment it had made, the Lao Government appointed members 
of the Pathet Lao to the positions of Provincial Chief in Phong Saly and Deputy Provincial 
Chief in Sam Neua, to the top positions in half the districts of the two provinces, and to half 
the lesser official posts. Following a visit to Sam Neua on March 1, 1958, the Political Com-
mittee of the ICC reported (Fourth Interim Report, Annexures 22 and 23) that it had 
learnt that integration was proceeding smoothly. Approximately 60 officials had been 
sent to Sam ^ u a by the R ^ a l Government of whom 20 were working in the 
Chaokhoueng's [J>rovincial Chie^ office, and 40 in the offices of other Government 
departments in Sam Neua. It was reported that these officials were working in com-
plete harmony side by side with former members of the Pathet Lao... . 
A similar report was issued following a visit to a town in Phong Saly province where the Com-
mittee was greeted by a member of the Pathet Lao who was in charge of the civil administra-
tion. 
Integration of the Pathet Lao Armed Forces into the Royal Lao Army 
Integration of the Pathet Lao armed forces into the Royal Lao Army was not foreseen 
under the Geneva Agreements as a prerequisite to the general settlement in Laos. However, 
this concession to the Pathet Lao was anticipated when Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma 
noted in an official statement on November 4, 1954 (cited in the First Interim Report of the 
ICC, Appendix J) that 
The unity of Government implies of necessity the unity of administration and unity 
of the Armed Forces. 
In a joint declaration on August 5, 1956, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Prince 
Souphanouvong, leader of the Pathet Lao, noted that they had reached an agreement on the 
principle of placing 
...the "Pathet Lao" troops under the High Command of the Royal Government and 
organizing them identically with those of the Royal Army. 
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A military agreement was signed by the Prime Minister and Prince Souphanouvong on 
November 12, 1957. Article 1 of the Agreement stated in part: 
The Royal Government und«2rtakes to integrate the Fighting Units of the Pathet Lao 
— into the National Army by taking over the entire personnel of these units and the 
entire equipment held by them... . 
Further clauses of the agreement provided that, in view of budgetary limitations., the number 
of Pathet Lao troops to be integrated into active service with the Lao national army would be 
limited to 1,500 (officers, non-commissioned officers, and men). 
At a special ceremony on February 18, 1958, at Plaines des Jarres in Xieng Khouang pro-
vince, southwest of Sam Neua, attended by the Military Committee of the ICC, 1,501 members 
of the Fighting Units of the Pathe : Lao were integrated into the Royal Lao army (ICC Fourth 
Interim Report, Chapter I and Annex\ire 58). In addition, Lao Government authorities pro-
cessed 4,284 Pathet Lao military personnel for release, 863 members of Pathet Lao families, 
202 Pathet Lao civilians, and 414 sick and disabled Pathet Lao military personnel. Following 
a visit to the Plaines des Jarres processing center, the Military Committee of the ICC ob-
served that 
the Royal Government had made the good arrangements for the reception, accommo-
dation and dispersal 
of the Pathet Lao forces and that 
The people looked happy and healthy and showed no signs of under-feeding. 
Similar observations were made as a result of visits to other processing centers. 
Despite the commitment to turn in to Royal Government authorities "the entire equipment 
held by them," the 6,199 Pathet Lao military personnel gave up only 4,773 weapons, including 
only 23 machine guns, 65 mortars, 40 carbines, 10 automatic rifles, and about 2,500 rifles 
(ICC Fourth Interim Report, Annexure 1)0). 
Adjournment of the International Commission for Supervision 
ana Control in Laos 
The Chairman of the ICC addressed a letter to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on 
November 26, 1957 (Fourth Interim Report, Annexure 20), in which he noted: 
I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the signature of the agree-
ments with the Fighting Units of the Pathet Lao and the inclusion of two Ministers i^A 
from the Pathet Lao in the present Cabinet constitutes the preliminary political 
settlement as stipulated in Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement. 
By this fact, the activities of the International Commission are near reaching their 
normal end. After the expiry of the period of implementation of the agreements of 
12th November 1957, only the supplementary elections will remain to be held to com-
plete the mission of the International Commission for Supervision and Control... . 
On March 5, 1958 the ICC informed the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference that with 
the integration ceremony at Plaines des Jarres "the Military Agreement had been fully im-
plemented." 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, in a letter to the chairman of the ICC on March 20, 
1958, wrote: 
I have the honour to bring to the kind notice of Your Excellency that in its session of 
13th of this month, the Cabinet Council has decided to ask for the winding up of the 
International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos with effect from the 
date of supplementary elections (4 May 1958). The Royal Government considers in 
fact that the supplementary elections of 4 May 1958 constitute the last phase of the 
implementation of the Geneva Agreements of 20 July 1954 on the cessation of hos-
tilities in Laos. 
While thanking Your Excellency for the distinguished services rendered to Laos by 
the International Commission for Supervision and Control, I should be grateful if 
Your Excellency could kindly bring the decision of the Royal Government to the es-
teemed notice of Their Excellencies the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.... 
- 1 2 -
1 
m 
Following the tabulation of the results of the supplementary elections of May 4, 1958, 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phoiima addressed a letter to the Chairman of the ICC on May 22, 
1958, notifying him that 
the Royal Government considers as fully accomplished the implementation of the 
agreement on the Cessation of hostilities in Laos as well as the fulfilment of the ob-
ligations undertaken by this Government at the Geneva Conference. The last supple-
mentary elections have consecrated the complete integration of all the Laotian cit-
izens in the National Community. 
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos thus sees the 
mission which had b^en entrusted to it by the Geneva Conference drawing success-
fully to a close. 
The Royal Government wishes to express to the International Commission its pro-
found gratitude for the efficacious assistance which it has extended to it, in order to 
reestablish in the Kingdom a normal situation in respect of its unity, sovereignty and 
independence. 
The Royal Government shall be grateful to the International Commission if it could 
kindly inform it about the arrangements which it has been able to make regarding its 
impending departure from Laos. . . . 
In a subsequent letter of May 31, 1958, the Prime Minister informed the ICC that 
...In order to avoid any ambiguity oji this subject jUie implementation by the Lao 
Government of the Geneva Agreement"^, I wish to specify that the Royal Government 
intends to continue to observe the obligation contained in its declaration made at the 
Geneva Qsi^ regarding [^ntry into military alliances and establishment of foreign 
military bases}. . . . 
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos subsequently adjourn-
ed sine die on July 19, 1958, and its members left the country. 
A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED 
Despite its recognition as a legal political party and its good showing in the May 4, 1958 
elections, the Neo Lao Hak Xat did not abandon the clandestine subversive network built up by 
the Communists in the previous years. Its agents continued the underground work of agitation 
in the countryside, concentrating on the ethnic minorities and on the areas where the Pathet 
Lao previously had been entrenched. 
The two major moderate parties, the National Progressives and the Independents, con-
cerned over these activities and their lack of unity which had contributed to the success of the 
Communist-led coalition in the May 4, 1958 supplementary elections, merged into-a new party, 
the Rally of the Lao People, on June 13, 1958. They issued the following commiinique on that 
date: 
Conscious of the menace that is constituted for the Kingdom by their disunion and the 
development of an extremist ideology, contrary to the customs and traditions of the 
Lao country; 
Desirous of assuring by their discipline the real independence and unity of the King-
dom against all attack from wherever it may come; 
The members of the National Progressive Party and the Independent Party met on 
June 13, 1958 and, after having adopted the statutes of a new party designated under 
the name of "Rally of the Lao People," have decided upon the dissolution of their 
parties. 
Other unaffiliated deputies have joined themselves to the reunion to create together 
this new party 
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Prime Minister Souvanna Pho\ima was elected President and Katay D. Sasorith and Phoui 
Sananikone Vice Presidents of the new party. 
On June 15, 1958, a group of energetic young civil servants, private businessmen, and 
military officers, feeling that younger Lao should play a greater part in the development of the 
.nation, formed a Committee for the Defense of the National Interests, 
Conscious of the menaces constituted by the intervention of Communist ideology in 
the institutions of the Kingdom whose destiny is seriously compromised by the sub-
versive intrigues aiming at destroying the democratic regime, guarantor of our 
liberty; jan^ 
Desirous of cleansing the political climate characterized by personal rivalries which 
prejudice national interests.... 
The committee pledged its full support to the Rally of the Lao People. 
The election of the 21 deputies in the supplementary elections of May 4, 1958 was vali-
dated by the National Assembly on July 22, 1958. On the same day, according to Lao constitu-
tional processes, the Cabinet of Prime Minister SouvannaPhouma submitted its resignation. 
In accepting the resignation, the Crown Prince noted that the Souvanna Phouma government 
had been specifically invested to solve the problem of integration of the Pathet Lao, which had 
been accomplished with the installation of the new deputies. A government headed by Phoui 
Sananikone, consisting mainly of members of the Rally of the Lao People and the Committee 
for the Defense of the National Interests, and without Pathet Lao participation, was invested 
by the newly expanded National Assembly on August 18, 1958, in accordance with constitution-
al procedures. 
In his investiture speech. Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone outlined his government's 
policy: 
Our objective is to preserve our newly won independence and unification. We 
must guard against the most threatening danger, which will undermine our independ-
ence and unification. This danger is Comm\mism. This problem should be solved by 
the new government. As approved by public opinion and the majority opinion of the 
National Assembly, I have selected members of political parties who desire to oppose 
commxmist expansion in Laos to participate in the government. The policy of the 
government that I have formed is as follows: 
To oppose the threat of this dangerous ideology, which is contrary to Lao-
tian custom and tradition, and which is expanding in Laos at present. 
To preserve national independence and unity by preventing subversive ^ 
dangers. ^ 
To preserve the constitutional monarchy. 
To eliminate graft and corruption.... 
To preserve world peace by strictly observing a neutral policy in accord-
ance with the principles of Panch Shila and the United Nations Charter. To 
preserve and expand existing relations with other countries 
At an extraordinary session of the National Assembly convened on January 12, 1959 
Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone reviewed the achievements of his government during the 
preceding five months. The Prime Minister noted continued threats to the integrity of Laos, 
stating that: 
...The subversive elements, whose misdeeds have been repeatedly denounced, have 
not slowed up their domestic activities. They have continued to sabotage the work of 
national restoration, although they know that the people have gradually withdrawn 
from their program, because--I can say--our efforts during these five months have 
served to enlighten the people.... 
...At the same time, we observe that the Republic of North Vietnam is concentrating 
its forces at several points on our frontier. A number of units have even penetrated 
our territory near Tchepone... ^ ^ 
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The situation is serious. Our eastern frontiers are seriously threatened,.. The gov-
ernment in which you have placed your confidence is unable, with the men and means 
at its disposal, to face this national danger. 
Concerning Lao foreign policy, the Prime Minister stated 
the government will remain faithful to the United Nations Charter and the five prin-
ciples of Panch Shila. The idea of quarreling with his neighbors or carrying out 
underhand maneuvers against them has never entered the head of any Laotian. We 
desire peace; the new government will pur sue a policy of friendship toward all coun-
tries, and will respect all frontiers. 
But let nobody mi is under stand our government's resolve to maintain a free and in-
dependent Laos. Laotians have shownmany times, and\inder somber circumstances, 
that they are able to defend their country at the cost of their blood.... 
On January 14, 1959, the National Assembly granted special powers to the Prime Minister for 
a period of twelve months, including the authority to revamp his cabinet. The session was ad-
journed by the Crown Prince, in the name of the King, on January 20, 1959. The cabinet as 
reorganized by the Prime Minister on January 24, 1959 included 16 members, among whom 
were most of the ten members of the previous cabinet. 
Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone, in a statement to the press on February 11, 1959, 
announced his agreement with the stand taken by former Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma 
concerning the fulfillment of Laos' obligations under the Geneva Agreements. The Prime 
Minister stated: 
...The Royal Government considers that the agreement on the cessation of hostilities 
in Laos has been completely fulfilled, as have been the obligations undertaken by the 
French High Command at the Geneva Conference. 
In subscribing to the Geneva Agreement with the sole purpose of contributing to the 
reestablishment of peace in Indochina, the Royal Government voluntarily contracted 
two obligations: to achieve a cessation of hostilities and a reintegration within the 
national community of those Laotian citizens who were not on the side of the Royal 
forces during the said hostilities. 
The cessation of hostilities has been a fact for several years. The elections of May 
4, 1958, which took place in a reg\ilar manner and according to the principles gov-
erning the exercise of democratic freedoms, permitted those Laotian citizens who 
had not been on the side of the Royal forces during the hostilities to be reintegrated 
within the national commtinity without discrimination.... 
The Prime Minister concluded: 
The Kingdom of Laos, an independent and sovereign country, cannot tolerate inter-
vention in its internal affairs. The Kingdom of Laos, an independent and sovereign 
country and today a member of the United Nations, only recognizes arbitration origi-
nating from that high international body. Following this clarification, which hence-
forth precludes the existence of any possible doubt or confusion concerning its atti-
tude toward the Geneva Agreements, the Royal Government wishes solemnly to re-
affirm its ideal of peace and its full adherence to Panch Shila and its faithfulness to 
the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
A communique issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Lao Government on 
February 17, 1959 expanded on the February 11 press statement of the Prime Minister. The 
communique also firmly enunciated the continuing determination of the Royal Government to 
protect the integrity of Laos, maintain democracy, and refrain from aggressive action, 
...The Lao people, basically peace-loving, have never nurtured bellicose sentiments 
against anyone. They have no intention of allowing foreign troops to enter or to be 
stationed in Laos nor of increasing their defense units, which in any event are rela-
tively small. The Royal Government nevertheless has the firm intention of reorganiz-
ing these \inits in order to provide for the effective defense of its territory. 
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In the same spirit, the Royal Government sees no need to establish new military-
bases and will never allow the territory of Laos to serve as a base for aggression. 
Furthermore, it plans no unusual increase in the armament of its modest army which 
, has never constituted and can never constitute a threat to its neighbors who are much 
more powerfxil in this respect. 
Laos, a coxmtry in which democratic freedoms flourish without hindrance, has never 
practiced persecution or discrimination. No Lao citizen who obeys the country's laws 
and regxxlations has any reason to fear for his life, safety or democratic freedoms. 
Finally, it sees no reason at the present time for participating in any military alli-
ance and will never adhere to a pact inconsistent with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter. 
In its effort to improve conditions in the country, as a prerequisite to the development of 
a deeper feeling of national unity, the government established on November 12, 1958 a rural 
affairs bureau, which, according to a commimique of the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy, is 
aimed at giving guidance to our rural life, from the humblest level up... It opens the 
way for a continuous action carried out by men who live with the people, who know 
them well, and who--thanks to their education and especially through their example 
and by the practice of modern technique--will progressively lead them toward a 
better life. 
Civic action training centers have begun to train rural aid teams to work in every province of 
the Kingdom, These teams represented in some instances the central government's first 
effective contact with the rural people. The government's program has had some success al-
most from its inception. One resultapparently was the resignation of many hundreds of people 
from the Neo Lao Hak Xat in regions where the rural aid program had been instituted. 
COMMUNIST BLOC STEPS UP ITS PRESSURE ON LAOS 
Starting in October and with mounting intensity since December 1958, when it became 
clear that the Royal Government of Laos was determined to take such action as was necessary 
to protect itseJf against subversion, the Commxinist bloc has levelled intensive and almost 
continuous pressure against the Lao Government in an obvious attempt to intimidate it. 
DRV Occupies a Piece of Laos 
On December 14, 1958, DRV troops crossed over the border into southeastern Laos and 
established several military positions, which they still occupy, in a small sector along the 
Nam Se river, east of Tchepone, Savannakhet province. The DRV then sent several notes to 
the Lao Government claiming title to the occupied territory. Although the Royal Government 
of Laos protested to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the DRV and officially 
informed the other members of the United Nations of the DRV violation of the Lao border, it 
has not attempted to oust the DRV troops by force.^ 
The Pathet Lao Battalion Mutinies and Escapes 
After their official integrationinto the Lao national army on February 18, 1958, the 1,500 
troops of the former Pathet Lao forces had been organized into two battalions. In accordance 
with its commitment \inder the military integration agreement (Article 3) of November 12, 
1957, to the effect that 
.. .The cadres and the specialists of the Pathet Lao Fighting Units integrated into the 
National Army shall be posted in the new units formed from the Pathet Lao Fighting 
Units in conformity with the strength rosters of the National Army and the budgetary 
strength of the army. . . 
1. DRV troops have also occupied, for several years, a small area near Nong Het, in Xieng 
Khouang province on the northeastern border between Laos and the DRV, which the DRV 
claims as its territory. 
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the Lao Government offered the Pathet Lao troops 41 officer and 400 non-commissioned officer 
positions. The Pathet Lao accepted the offer of non-commissioned officer ranks, but demanded 
112 officer positions. 
In an effort to reach a settlement, the Lao Government agreed to the Pathet Lao demand 
on March 19, 1959. General Ouane Ratrikoun, Chief of Staif of the Lao Army, informed Prince 
Souphanouvong on May 9, 1959 of the government's plan t6 distribute ranks on May 11, 1959 
among members of the two integrated Pathet Lao battalions. Despite the fact that the Pathet 
Lao demands had been met, Prince Souphanouvong refused to agree to the government's plan. 
On May 11, the leaders of the two battalions refused to take part in the ceremony planned for 
the award of ranks and ordered their men to arm and deploy themselves. 
In response to this mutinous action, the Royal Army command alerted its forces in the 
vicinity and placed the leaders of the Neo Lao Hak Xat and the Santiphab under surveillance. 
At the same time, however, recognizing that despite the orders of the Communist leadership 
many of the ex-Pathet Lao soldiers wished to accept their Royal Army ranks, the Lao Army 
on May 14 offered the former Pathet Lao soldiers the choice of submitting, resigning from 
the service, or being declared rebels. In response, the first battalion, stationed in Luang Pra-
bang province, submitted on May 17. 
However, the second battalion, statioped in Xieng Khoxiang province, fled camp on May 18, 
1959. On Jxine 3, it succeeded in escaping through the lines of regular units seeking to encircle 
it. The Lao Government announced on June 10, 1959 that military operations against the 
escaped battalion had been officially terminated and that the Neo Lao Hak Xat and Santiphab 
leaders had been released from surveillance. The dissident battalion subsequently made its 
way to the north Vietnamese border. Elements of this battalion have been reported engaged 
on the side of the Communist-led forces which have been fighting in Laos since July 1959. 
Propaganda and Diplomatic Pressure 
The DRV, which apparently considers Laos to be in its particular sphere of influence, has 
played the most importantpart in the Communist bloc's propaganda and diplomatic campaign, 
but both Communist China and the USSR have also been very active. 
In highly inflammatory fashion. Communist bloc propaganda since December 1958 has 
repeatedly and falsely accused the Lao Government of deliberately provoking the DRV and 
Communist China; committing serious violations of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and of the 
Lao Government-Pathet Lao accords of 1956-57; acting in collusion with Chinese Nationalist 
irregular forces and south Vietnamese agents; violating the D R V s land borders and airspace; 
and permitting the United States to establish military bases in Laos. Such accusations more-
over have frequently been accompanied by strong hints of Communist bloc military retalia-
tion. 
After the rebellious Pathet Lao battalion escaped to the north Viet-Nam border. Com-
munist propaganda began to insist that a "civil war" was taking place in Laos.. The Lao na-
tional army was accused of having launched "terrorist" raids against members of the defected 
battalion, although no armed hostilities were taking place in Laos at that time. The Communist 
propaganda campaign was obviously preparing the stage for the outbreak of such hostilities in 
mid-July 1959. 
A few typical examples of Communist propaganda attacks on the Lao Government are set 
forth below. 
On February 4, 1959, Radio Peiping charged that ". . .the Laotian reactionaries (I.e., 
the government] are trying to persecute the democratic forces in Laos in order to 
assume dictatorial control over the co\mtry." 
On May 18, 1959, a Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry statement asserted 
that recent measures of the Lao Government, including efforts to integrate Pathet 
Lao troops into the national army and the placing of several Neo Lao Hak Xat leaders 
under house arrest, were "tantamoxmt to openly launching a civil war in Laos." It 
proceeded to warn: "If the Laotian authorities do not stop promptly before it is too 
late, not only will Laos be drawn into the whirlpool of k civil war, but the peace of 
Indochina will be seriously endangered as well." 
A letter sent on June 1, 1959 by DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to the In-
dian chairman of the adjourned ICC for Laos asserted that "violent battles" between 
Lao Government units and Pathet Lao forces were taking place in the Xieng Khouang 
region of Laos near the DRV border. 
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A letter sent on June 2, 1959, by the DRV Prime Minister to Lao Prime Minist'er 
Phoui Sananikone charged that alleged activities by Lao Government forces near the 
border "represent a constant threat to our security... . We cannot remain indifferent 
to the grave incidents which are developing in Laos. . , . The civil war which you have 
deliberately rekindled is developing and drawing nearer and near to our frontier." 
•et . * . • 
A Radio Hanoi broadcast of June 10, 1959 called the maneuver of the Pathet Lao 
battalion in escaping encirclement by and integration into the Lao army " a new epic 
of the Lao people." 
DRV broadcasts on July 1, 8, and 11, 1959, and on subsequent dates, dissemi-
nated violent propaganda against the Lao Government which supposedly emanated 
from the dissident Pathet Lao battalion and was addressed to the Lao people. 
Radio Moscow on July 8, 1959 claimed that Laos had fomented border provoca-
tions against the DRV, and went on to state that Communist China and the DRV 
"strongly protest the dangerous actions... which contain a danger of a great armed 
dispute," 
THE COMMUNISTS REVERT TO OPEN FIGHTING IN LAOS 
Ho Chi Minh's Trip to the Soyiet Union and 
Communist China 
On July 2, 1959, approximately two weeks before the Pathet Lao staged its first armed 
attack on Lao Government posts in Sam Neua province, DRV President Ho Chi Minh arrived 
in Moscow. Contrary to the usual practice, there had been no advance publicity concerning his 
trip. Radio Moscow announced on July 3 that Ho had had a conversation with Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev on that day. Ho presumably had additional talks with Premier Khrushchev 
and other high level Soviet leaders before his departure from the Soviet Union about J\ily 31. 
It can be assumed that Ho and the Soviet leaders discussed conditions in Indochina, including 
the situation in Laos. 
From the USSR, Ho went to Communist China, where he spent approximately three weeks, 
including about ten days in Peiping. According to Radio Peiping, he met with several promi-
nent Chinese Commvinist leaders, including Chou En-lai, in Peiping on August 21, 1959. 
In addition, two lesser members of the DRV* s Communist Party politburo, Nguyen Duy 
Trinh and Le Thanh Nghi, visited the USSR during August 1959 and were received by Deputy 
Premier Mikoyan. 
The Current Situation in Laos 
On a night in mid-July 1959, a Communist-controlled force overran a Lao army outpost 
in Sam Neua province, close to the north Vietnamese border. This action signaled the begin-
ning of broader armed attacks by the Communists constituting a new challenge to the terri-
torial integrity and independence of Laos. 
The Communist attacks recalled a statement by the Pathet Lao leader. Prince Souphanou-
vong, on November 18, 1957: 
. . .I , supreme representative of the entire Pathet Lao, herewith formally declare the 
presentation of Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, including the administrative or-
ganizations, troops, officials, and all weapons and equipment of the Pathet Lao, by 
His Majesty the King of Laos. 
All these administrative organizations, troops, and officials will respect and defend 
the nation, religion, the King, and constitution and will comply with all rules and re-
gulations, carrying out their duties like all Laotian compatriots throughout the 
kingdom... 
The fighting has been concentrated in the provinces of Sam Neua and to a lesser extent 
Phong Saly, both of which are contiguous to north Viet-Nam. The Communist forces have im-
posed their control on a considerable portion of Sam Neua, and have threatened the town of 
Sam Nexia, the provincial capital. Incidents have occurred also in other parts of Laos. The 
main elements of the attacking forces appear to consist df former Pathet Lao soldiers and 
members of several ethnic-minority groups located in areas straddling the Lao-north Viet-
namese border. 
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The attacking Communist forces have been vigorously supported by the propaganda and 
diplomatic resources of the Communist bloc, Hanoi has served as the mouthpiece of demands 
on the Lao Government, allegedly originating with the Pathet Lao troops and the Neo Lao Hak 
Xat. Not only Hanoi but Peiping and Moscow as well have indulged in a coordinated campaign 
of threat and calumny against the government, for the apparent purpose of intimidating both 
the Lao Government into giving in to the Communists, and the United States into ceasing its 
support of Laos. Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow all rejected the competence of the United Nations 
to act in the face of the dangerous situation in Laos. The following are typical instances of the 
Communists' psychological warfare. 
On August 4, 1959, the Communist Viet-Nam News Agency quoted from an article in a 
north Vietnamese youth publication which proclaimed that the "traitorous"actions of 
the Lao Government "would by no means quench the patriotic movement in Laos" but 
would increase the anger of the Laotian people at the "terrorist raids" of government 
troops. 
Radio Hanoi on August 7, 1959 broadcast an "appeal" from the Neo Lao Hak Xat to 
"the entire Laotian people," exhorting them "to close their ranks and to struggle 
against US imperialist interference in Laos and against the Phoui Sananikone clique 
scheme to sell out the coxintry" and demanding very substantial political concessions 
to the Communists. A similar appeal by a spokesman of the Neo Lao Hak Xat was 
broadcast by Radio Hanoi on August 21, 1959. 
A spokesman of the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry asserted on August 12, 
1959, that "the sit\iation in Laos has further deteriorated recently," that the alleged 
desire of the United States "to turn Laos into a US military base" and bring it into 
SEA TO posed "a threat to China and Viet-Nam, as well as to the peace of all South-
east Asia, " and that "the United Nations has no right at all to intervene" in the de-
velopments in Laos. 
A TASS release from Moscow, dated August 27, 1959, declared that "the danger of the 
expansion of civil war (Tn LaoiJ is increasing"; also that US military assistance to 
Laos and other alleged military preparations "show that foreign interference in Laos 
is becoming much more widespread, threatening to spread the military conflagration 
to all of Southeast Asia." 
Both the Viet-Nam News Agency and the Chinese Communists' New China News 
Agency on September 10, 1959 reported the message of a Neo Lao Hak Xat leader 
listing a series of demands as a prerequisite to a peaceful settlement with the Lao 
Government; and both of these Communist news agencies distributed the first news 
on September 15, 1959 of an allegedNeo Lao Hak Xat message to the United Nations 
denouncing the creation of the "fact-finding subcommittee" as a violation of the 
United Nations Charter. 
On September 14, 1959, the New China News Agency carried an item, datelined Hanoi, 
September 14, referring to the first appearance on September 8 of an alleged "Eng-
lish language" edition of the Lao Hak Xat, press medium of the Neo Lao Hak Xat. 
The nature and locale of the fighting, and the Communist psychological warfare, reflect 
the responsibility and involvement of the Commimistbloc, and most directly north Viet-Nam, 
in the fighting. The case against the Communists was summarized in two statements ad-
dressed by the Royal Government of Laos to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 
August 4 and September 4, 1959. 
Laos Appeals to the United Nations 
The ForeignMinister of the Royal Government of Laos telegraphed the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations on August 4, 1959 as follows: 
I have the honor to inform you of the following: 
Since 16 July last, serious fighting has been going on in the province of Sam Neua. 
Several posts of the Lao National Army have been attacked and their garrisons dis-
persed, causing several deaths. The fighting area is along the border of Laos and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietneun, extending from 15 to 50 kilometers inside Lao 
territory, 
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The Democratic Republic of Vietnam claii^s, contrary to the truth, that these trou-
bles come from a popular uprising. In fact, these troubles would not have occurred 
if: 
(1) Radio Hanoi, with the support of Radio Peiping, had not been waging for sev-
eral months a campaign of false accusations against Laos, encouraging in this way 
the former Pathet Lao Fighting Units to rebel and agitating the Laotian people living 
near the border. To that end, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had tripled the 
number of its daily broadcasts in the Lao language. 
(2) If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had not given arms to the rebels, the 
former Pathet Lao Fighting Units having given up their own arms at the time of the 
of the Agreement concluded in 1957 between the Royal Government and the Pathet 
Lao. 
(3) If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were not sending them supplies, the 
area being sparsely populated and poor and therefore unable to.provision fighting 
troops. 
(4) If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had not armed its minority elements 
close to the border in order to send them to cooperate with the rebels. 
(5) If Radio Hanoi were not allowing the deserters to use its broadcasting facil-
ities. 
By its attitude, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has violated the Geneva Agree-
ments, which stipulate the non-interference in the domestic affairs of a signatory 
country. It has also violated the agreement which it signed with Laos in August 
1956, which sets forth the same principle. Faithful to its policy of peace and neu-
trality, the Royal Government has always scrupulously respected international agree-
ments. It has not joined any military pact and has allowed no installation of military 
bases or entry of foreign troops. Any attempt to present it as a troublemaker can be 
nothing but a deliberate distortion of the truth. The only ambition of the Lao people is 
to live in peace with all its neighbors, in accord with its peacefxil character and with 
its Buddhist culture. 
I would be grateful if you would inform the Member States of the above-mentioned 
facts. 
On August 20, 1959 a special envoy of the Royal Government of Laos met with the UN 
Secretary-General to present a detailed outline of the situation in L?ios and submit a letter 
from the Royal Lao Government inviting the Secretary-General to suggest such procedures or 
measures as he might consider appropriate to achieve a peaceful settlement of the current 
difficulties in Laos. 
Confronted by a worsening of the situation in Laos as a result of the coordinated attacks 
of August 30, 1959» the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of Laos on Sep-
tember 4, 1959 sent the following note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Since 16 July 1959, foreign troops have been crossing the frontier and engaging in 
military action against garrison units of the Royal Army stationed along the north-
eastern frontier of Laos. These garrison units have been obliged to evacuate several 
posts and to engage in nimierous defensive actions. It is obvious that these attacks 
would not have taken place if the attackers had not come from outside the country and 
would not have continued if the attackers had not been receiving reinforcements and 
supplies of food and munitions from outside. As a result of these attacks, losses have 
been suffered by the Royal Army. On 30 August a new attack, more violent than the 
previous ones, was launchedagainst the posts of Muong(Ret]and Xieng Kho. Elements 
from the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam took part in the attack, which was sup-
ported by artillery fire from the other side of the frontier. In the face of this flagrant 
aggression, full responsibility for which rests with the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam, Laos requests the assistance of the United Nations, of which it is a Member; 
it is doing sounder Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Char-
ter. In particular, the Royal Government requests that an emergency force sho\ild be ^ ^ 
dispatched at a very early date in order to halt the aggression and prevent it from 
spreading. 
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In response to this note, the UN Security Council met on September 7, 1959 and on the 
following day adopted the following resolution: 
The Security Council 
Decides to appoint a sub-committee consisting of Argentina, Italy, Japan and 
Tunisia, and instructs t^iis sub-committee to examine the statements made before the 
Security Covmcil concerning Laos, to receive further statements and documents and 
to conduct such inquiries as it may determine necessary and to report to the Security 
Council as soon as possible. 
The sub-committee appointed by the Security Council arrived in Laos on September 15, 
1959. 
THE DEFENSES OF LAOS 
The Royal Lao Military Establishment 
The Royal Government's small defense establishment, still inan early stage of develop-
ment, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as posing a threat to Laos* 
neighbors.! At the time of the Communist attacks in July 1959» the Lao armed forces con-
sisted of an army of 25,000 men and a village militia ("auto-defense") of about 16,000 men. 
As a result of the Communist attacks measures were taJken to increase the strength of the 
army and militia. These organizations are lightly equipped with weapons of World War II or 
earlier vintage. Laos possesses no combat planes, and only a few light transport and liaison 
aircraft. The National police frrce totals about 3,000 men. 
Foreign Assistance 
France, as specifically authorized by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cessation of Hos-
tilities in Laos (Articles 6 and 8) maintains a Military Mission to train and advise the Lao 
national army, and one small military base situated at Seno near the town of Savannakhet in 
central Laos. The French military personnel now in Laos constitute only a small fraction of 
those authorized by the Agreement, which permitted 1,500 men for the Military Mission and 
3,500 men for the French military garrison. Moreover, the Agreement (Article 8) permitted 
France to maintain a second base "in the Mekong Valley, either in the province of Vientiane 
or downstream from Vientiane," which, however, has never been established. 
The United States furnishes financial and material support to the Lao armed forces and 
recently at the request of the Lao government has imdertaken jointly with the French to help 
in various types of training related to the military establishment. 
Other than Seno, no foreign military base exists in Laos nor has the Royal Government of 
Laos entered into any military alliance. 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
Although Laos is not a party to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and conse-
quently not a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), under certain con-
ditions it may be protected under the defense provisions of the Treaty in accordance with a 
Protocol to the Treaty. In signing the Treaty at Manila on September 8, 1954, the eight parties 
(Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) agreed as follows: 
Article I, The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peace-
ful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not 
endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.,, . 
1. DRV regiilar army forces are estimated to total at least 250,000 men. 
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Article IV. 1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack 
in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which 
the Parties by unanimous agreementmay hereafter designate, would endanger its own 
peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger 
in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. 
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area 
or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack 
or is affected or threatened by any factor situation which might endanger the ^eace 
of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures 
which should be taken for the common defense. 
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by 
unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so desig-
nated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government 
concerned. 
Under the Protocol to the Treaty, also signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, 
The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate 
for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the 
free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam. 
THE UNITED STATES HELPS LAOS 
Economic Aid 
When Laos assumed complete responsibility for its own defense in 1954, it found its own 
economic and financial resources insufficient to support even minimal security forces. The 
Royal Government requested financial assistance from the United States to support its national 
defense as well as to provide a measure of internal financial stability. 
The United States is furnishing economic aid to Laos under the terms of notes exchanged 
with the Royal Government of Laos on July 6 and 8, 1955, and retroactive to January 1, 1955. 
The notes expanded the scope of the Economic Cooperation Agreement between the United 
States and Laos of September 9» 1951 in order "to further the economic objectives of that 
Agreement and to promote the effective defense of the Kingdom of Laos. " The Agreement of 
September 9, 1951 was intended to further "sound economic conditions and stable international 
economic relationships" on which, it recognized, "individual liberty, free institutions, and in-
dependence" largely depended. The US economic aid program in Laos is administered by a 
United States Operations Mission (USOM), staffed by the International Cooperation Admini-
stration and operating in the field, in accordance with usual procedures, under the general 
direction of the US Ambassador. 
US aid authorized under this program from January 1, 1955 through June 50, 1959 totaled 
$190,281,000. Most of this amount was allocated to budgetary support for the Lao army, 
police, and certain government services. A program of technical assistance has also been 
carried on, primarily in the fields of agriculture, health, and education, and funds have been 
made available for the expansion of power and transport facilities. 
Military Aid 
The United States provided extensive assistance in the form of military equipment and 
supplies as well as financial support to France in its war against the Communists in Indo-
china, which ended with the Geneva Conference of 1954. Such aid was given in accordance with 
the Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United States of Amer-
ica and Cambodia, France, Laos and Viet.-Nam (so-called "Pentalateral Agreement"), signed 
at Saigon on December 23, 1950, in recognition of 
the common interest of the free peoples of the world in the maintenance of the in-
dependence, peace, and security of nations devoted to the principles of freedom. 
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After the end of hostilities in Indochina in 1954, the Royal Government of Laos requested 
the United States to continue providing military assistance to Laos, and this has been done 
under the Pentalateral Agreement, which remains in force. (The Geneva Agreements author-
ized the introduction into Laos of military equipment "necessary for the defence of Laos.") 
Administration of the military assistance program was, and continues to be, entrusted to a 
Programs Evaluation Office established within the USOM at Vientiane. 
In addition to supervising, through the Programs Evaluation Office, the provision of mili-
tary equipment and supplies for the Lao national army, the United States also has a number of 
technicians to train the army in the use and maintenance of US equipment. These training 
activities are undertaken in cooperation with the French Military Mission, which has overall 
responsibility for military training in Laos including the conduct of tactical training. 
i Recently the United States agreed, pursuant to the Royal Government's request of July 23, 
1959 (arrived at in conjunction with the French Government), to furnish a number of techni-
cians to participate for six months to one year in an emergency training program for the Lao 
forces. A group of US technicians attached to the PEO recently arrived in Laos for this pur-
pose. Training under this program is vuider the overall supervision of the French Military 
Mission. 
The inability of the Lao armed forces to cope effectively with the Communist-led dis-
sident activity that began in July 1959 emphasized the need for an increase in the nvimber and 
capability of Lao troops. In response to a request of the Lao Government, the United States 
Government approved an increase in military aid to Laos and issued the following statement 
to the press on August 26, 1959: 
The United States strongly supports the determination of the Royal Lao Government 
to resist Communist efforts to undermine the security and stability of Laos. Con-
trary to repetitious allegations from Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow, the United States 
reiterates that it has no military bases, air strips, or other military installations in 
Laos; and the few American technicians in Laos are there at the request of the 
French and Lao Governments to help in the training of the Lao National Army in t;^ e 
use and maintenance of certain World War II type equipment. ^ 
The United States will continue to support reasonable approaches to achieve a peace-
ftil solution to the current situation in Laos. Unlike the Sino-Soviet bloc, the United 
States does not believe that there should be recourse to the use of force in resolving 
this matter. However, the Communists have posed their threat to Laos in terms that 
require adequate military and police countermeasures if that nation's integrity is to 
be preserved. The United States has, therefore, responded to specific requests from 
the Lao Government for improving its defense position by authorizing sufficient addi-
tional aid to permitt^mporary emergency increases in the Lao National Army and in 
the Village Militia which provides local police protection. The additional aid will 
permit the specific increases desired by the Government of Laos, The United States 
has also, in the course of the past week, taken steps to help improve the mobility of 
the Royal Lao Army and to otherwise help give that small nation better means to 
withstand what appears even more clearly to be an extensive Communist design to 
disrupt and subvert Laos. 
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